Torts Outline

TORTS

1. Intentional Torts
   1. Intent
      1. Overview and Definition
         1. Intentional torts require that D act with intent (not recklessness or negligence).
         2. Intent = D desires the result or knows to a substantial certainty that it will occur.
            1. Intent is subjective (D must, in his own mind, exhibit desire or substantial certainty) - whether a reasonable person would have been substantially certain is evidentiary but not dispositive.
      2. Intent as "Desire"
         1. Intent is satisfied if D desires the consequences of his acts.
      3. Intent as "Substantial Certainty"
         1. Intent is also satisfied when D is substantially certain (in his own mind) that his acts will cause the elements of the tort to occur.
         2. Garratt v. Dailey: The court remanded to the trial court the issue of whether a five-year-old boy was substantially certain the victim would fall while attempting to sit on a chair the boy had moved.
      4. Transferred Intent
         1. Applies to five traditional trespass torts:
            1. Assault
            2. Battery
            3. False Imprisonment
            4. Trespass to Chattel
            5. Trespass to Land
         2. If D intends any of these five torts, but his acts instead or in addition result in any of the other five intentional torts, D is liable, even though he did not intend the other tort.
            1. Intent transfers from one tort to another (with the five).
            2. Intent transfers from one intended victim to another.
         3. Restatement only allows transferred intent between assault and battery.
      5. The Mistake Doctrine (reasonable mistake of fact is no defense)
         1. If D intends to do acts which would constitute a tort, it is no defense that D mistakes, even reasonably, the identity of the property or person he acts upon or believes incorrectly that there is a privilege.
      6. Insanity and Infancy (not defenses)
         1. Neither insanity nor infancy is a defense to intentional torts.
         2. D may be so young or mentally ill that he may not actually possess the requisite intent because it is a subjective test.
         3. However, the child or insane person need not appreciate the significance or wrongfulness of his act.
            1. D, a child, may be substantially certain that V will hit the floor if he pulls the chair away even though he does not know that she will incur injuries as a result of his conduct.
   2. Battery
      1. Overview and Definition

Battery occurs when D's acts intentionally cause harmful or offensive contact with V's person.

1. Accidental contact must be analyzed under negligence or strict liability.

D must desire or be substantially certain that his action will cause the apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive conduct.

1. 1. 1. Motive is irrelevant.
   2. Accidental creation of such apprehension may be negligent infliction of emotional distress but not assault.
   3. Transferred intent between the other four trespass torts applies.
      1. Alteiri v. Colasso:
2. Apprehension
   1. V must perceive that harmful or offensive contact is about to happen to him.
   2. If V is attacked from behind or while asleep, there is no assault.
   3. Apprehension can be created even if D does not have the ability to actually cause the harmful or offensive contact.
      1. If D tells V that a gun is loaded when it is not and fires the gun at V, he may be guilty of assault even though there was no possibility of causing the battery.
   4. Apprehension can only be created if D has the apparent ability to cause the harmful or offensive contact.
3. Imminent Harmful or Offensive Contact
   1. V's apprehension must be of imminent harmful or offensive contact.
   2. SPLIT
      1. Traditional rule = Words alone are insufficient to establish assault; an overt act must establish the imminent threat.
      2. Restatement = Verbal statements can on occasion imply sufficient immanency.
         1. Restatement agrees that the threat must be imminent, though.
   3. Castro v. Local 1199: Threatening an employee while slamming a table was "forward looking" and was therefore insufficiently immediate to constitute assault.
   4. The threatened harm may be harmful or simply offensive.
4. Reasonable Apprehension
   1. SPLIT
      1. Many Jxs require the victim to suffer "reasonable" apprehension.
      2. Restatement rejects the "reasonable" requirement.
         1. Under Restatement, D's exploitation of V's unreasonable fears or gullibility is compensable.
         2. However, Restatement probably did not intend to include a privileged act in the definition of assault.
5. Fear versus Apprehension
   1. The requisite apprehension of imminent contact need not produce fear in V.
   2. Apprehension acknowledges V's awareness that imminent harmful or offensive contact will occur unless V takes effective evasive action.
   3. V's confidence that he can effectively evade D (and hence, lack of fear) does not minimize D's liability for assault.
   4. Apprehension of an offensive, but not harmful, contact can constitute assault, even though the mere offensiveness of the imminent contact would not induce fear.

Conditional Assault

1. Assault made conditional on V's noncompliance with an unlawful demand still constitutes assault, even if V is confident no assault will actually occur if V complies with the unlawful request.
   1. If D brandishes a club and threatens to beat V over the head unless V gives D his wallet, D is guilty of assault.

False imprisonment can result from D's omission when he had a duty to act.

1. 1. 1. 1. D invites V on his boat and promises to bring V ashore when requested, D's failure to do so constitutes false imprisonment.
      2. There is no general duty to act, so P must establish that D, in the specific circumstance, has a duty to act.
   2. Improper Assertion of Legal Authority (False Arrest)
      1. False arrest is false imprisonment by means of improperly asserting legal authority.
      2. V must submit to the arrest for it to constitute imprisonment.
      3. The arrest is improper if the actor imposing confinement is not privileged under the circumstances.
         1. Privileges for police officers
            1. Arrests pursuant to an apparently valid warrant are privileged.
            2. A police officer is privileged to arrest for a felony without a warrant when he reasonably suspects that the other is guilty.
            3. Police officers are privileged to arrest for misdemeanors constituting breaches of the peace occurring in their presence.
         2. Privileges for private citizens
            1. A private citizen is only privileged when she reasonably suspects the individual arrested committed a felony and a felony in fact has taken place.
               1. D can make a reasonable mistake in arresting the wrong person but only if the felony has actually taken place.
            2. Private citizens are privileged to arrest for misdemeanors constituting breaches of the peace occurring in their presence.
            3. If D fraudulently induces V into wrongfully believing that D is a police officer, and V submits to detention under circumstances where only a police officer is privileged to detain, D has committed false imprisonment by false arrest.

2. Contrast False Arrest with Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process
   1. Where an arrest is privileged and therefore conforms to all requisite legal requirements to justify arrest, the possibility of liability for false arrest is precluded
   2. A lawful arrest if motivated by bad faith and satisfying other elements, may constitute malicious prosecution.
   3. The improper use of certain compulsory processes such as subpoenas, despite conforming to legal requirements, and therefore not false imprisonment, may be tortious as abuse of process.
3. Consciousness of Confinement
   1. False imprisonment requires that V be conscious of the confinement at the time of the imprisonment.
      1. Restatement modifies this requirement and would find liability where V is not aware of the confinement but is harmed by the confinement.
4. No Minimum Time
   1. False imprisonment covers even minimal lengths of detention.

The amount of compensation awarded for false imprisonment will reflect the length of detention.

Improper purpose is established if D brought criminal or civil proceedings against P:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. Whom D did not think was guilty or liable; or
            2. In order to harass P or gain some extraneous advantage unrelated to the merits of the litigation (even if D believes that P is guilty or liable for the charge).
         2. If D simply dislikes P, this alone does not prove malice or improper purpose.

      2. Damages suffered by P.
         1. Damages include economic consequences of the wrongful litigation, emotional distress, reputational injury, and (where malice is established) punitive damages.
         2. MIN (English Rule): Only allows MICP where P incurred some special damage such as seizure of the person, attachment of property, or an injunction (does not apply to MP).
   2. Immunity of Public Officials
      1. Prosecutors, judges (acting a judicial capacity), other public officials (except public defenders), and the government that employs them are generally immune from discretionary decisions to prosecute.
   3. Interaction Between False Imprisonment and MP/MICP
      1. Imprisonment under criminal process or civil commitment does not constitute false imprisonment as long as proper legal procedures are followed.
2. Abuse of Process
   1. Definition: Intentional misuse of either a civil or criminal legal process for an ulterior purpose (than for which it was designed) resulting in damage to the plaintiff.
      1. P must prove the ulterior purpose.
   2. Unlike MP/MICP:
      1. There is no need to await the outcome of the proceedings (can address the abuse of legal processes within such litigation).
      2. Abuse of process can apply regardless of who ultimately wins the litigation.
   3. Mancini v. Marquette Univ.: The court reversed liability on a claim of false imprisonment, but held that the plaintiff alleged a proper case for abuse of process. P, a student at Marquette University, was restrained from leaving campus by the university dean and others through wrongful use of temporary civil commitment procedures designed to determine whether P's mental condition required imposing detention. University officials knew P's mental condition did not justify civil commitment, but used the procedure to temporarily detain the student until her father could be notified of her intent to withdraw from the university. The court held that the university's compliance with legal procedures precluded P's claim of false imprisonment, but that D's misuse of procedure allowed liability for abuse of process.
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
   1. Definition: IIED exists when D, by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly causes V severe mental distress (MAJ = no physical manifestation needed).
      1. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct

Restatement definition: conduct which is beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly impossible in a civilized community.

1. No objective standard, but mere rudeness or callousness is insufficient.
2. The vulnerability or known sensitivity of V (e.g., whether a child or very ill) and the relationship between D and V (e.g., whether superior-subordinate) are important.

D acted with a deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that severe emotional distress would result (i.e., recklessness).

1. 1. 1. Severe Mental Distress
         1. P must actually suffer severe mental distress.
            1. Mild distress will not suffice.
            2. MAJ: physical manifestations (heart attack, stomach trouble attributable to stress or shock) of severe mental distress are not necessary.
   2. Third-Party Recovery
      1. IIED is not one of the five torts that allows transferred intent.
      2. However, if D is substantially certain or deliberately disregards a high degree of risk that V will incur severe emotional distress by observing D's conduct (e.g., by attacking a young child's parent in front of the child), D may be liable for IIED.
      3. Courts have usually limited recovery to indirect third-party victims when (all three):
         1. The third party is a close relative of the direct (intended) victim;
         2. The third party is Present at the scene of the outrageous conduct against the direct victim; and
         3. D knows that the close relative is present.
            1. Restatement does not require D's knowledge of the close relative's presence.
      4. Restatement also allows non-relatives that can satisfy all other elements of the tort to recover if they are present and suffer physical manifestations of severe distress.
      5. If D intends to cause emotional distress to the third party by his actions toward another, the third party becomes a direct victim and need not be present, a close relative, or suffer physical symptoms.
   3. Exception for Innkeepers, Common Carriers, and Other Public Utilities
      1. Innkeepers, common carriers, and other public utilities (e.g., telegraph company) are liable for intentional gross insults (rather than extreme and outrageous conduct) that cause patrons to suffer mental distress (rather than severe distress).
         1. P must be a patron of D - but need not have already purchased a ticket, etc.
      2. MAJ: acknowledge these exceptions but do not extend them.
         1. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores: The court held, without deciding whether to generally adopt the tort of IIED, that special liability for public utilities did not apply to a grocery store. A grocery clerk told a customer, "You stink to me," allegedly causing V a heart attack aggravated from pre-existing heart condition. There was no allegation that D knew about the pre-existing condition.
2. Intentional Interference with Contract (IIK) / Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations (IIPER)
   1. Definitions: IIK and IIPER are parallel; IIK requires a valid K while IIPER requires a legitimate economic expectancy. The torts are only available against third-party meddlers, not against a party who breaches his own K or terminates his own economic relationship. The elements of the torts are (all five):
      1. Valid K or Economic Expectancy between P and a Third Party;
         1. IIK requires proof of a valid K.

Texaco v. Pennzoil: An unsigned oral agreement was held to be a valid K under applicable state law.

Interference by someone when protecting his or her own legally protected interests in good faith an by appropriate means; or

1. 1. 1. Inducing breach of a K that unlawfully interferes with a legally protected interest or right.
   2. Justifications only for IIPER or at-will K:
      1. Fair and ethical competition; or
      2. Ethical action to protect one's financial interest.
   3. Restatement factors to help determine other instances when interference with prospective economic relations or contract is not improper:
      1. Nature of the actor's conduct;
      2. Actor's motive;
      3. Interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes;
      4. Interests sought to be advanced by the actor;
      5. Social interests in protecting the actor's freedom of action and the other's contractual interest;
      6. Proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference; and
      7. Relations between the parties.

2. Wrongful Termination of Employment Contract
   1. Definition: An employer may be liable for wrongful discharge, or wrongful termination, where its termination of an employee contravenes public policy.
      1. This tort is irrespective of whether the employee's termination violated an employment K.
   2. Termination Must Be for a Reason that Contradicts Public Policy (all four):
      1. Delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions;
      2. "Public" in the sense that in inures to the benefit of the public rather than serving merely the interests of the individual;
      3. Well established at the time of the discharge; and
      4. Substantial and fundamental.
   3. Terminations Found to Violate Public Policy
      1. Age discrimination;
      2. Questioning and objecting to employer's making deductions from pay;
      3. Retaliation for alerting authorities to potential criminal conduct by employer;
      4. Retaliation for disclosing illegal, unethical, or unsafe practices like hazardous working conditions;
      5. Refusal to join employer in violating the law.
   4. Terminations Found Not to Violate Public Policy
      1. Informing a superior that one's current supervisor is being investigated by the FBI for embezzlement charges at the supervisor's former employer (serves employer's private interest rather than a public interest).
      2. Corporate officer's informing the board of directors that the employer may have been abusing its tax-exempt status (D did not link his duty to any explicit policy or clear mandate that was violated by his discharge).
      3. Retaliation for making critical remarks on an internal survey (tort would have converted an at-will employment relationship to one requiring good cause for termination).
3. Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

In each K, there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to allow for the terms of the K to be interpreted fairly.

Misrepresentations must be material to be actionable (i.e., either a reasonable person would attach importance to it in determining his action in the relevant transaction or the maker of the statement knows or should know the person to whom the misrepresentation is addressed is likely to regard it as important).

1. 1. Traditionally, failure to disclose was not a basis for liability.
      1. Except where there is a duty to disclose:
         1. Fiduciaries must disclose material facts.
         2. An actor who initially misleads V (even innocently) or conceals information has a duty to disclose and correct the misimpression.
         3. Several courts have held that sellers in a transaction must disclose fundamental defects that the potential purchaser would not be likely to discover.
         4. Restatement concludes that there is an obligation to disclose facts basic to the transaction if D knows that V is about to enter it under a mistake as to them, and that V, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.
2. Requisite Scienter (Intent or Recklessness);
   1. D must know the misrepresentation is false or act with reckless disregard as to its truth of falsity.
      1. Recklessness = D made the representation consciously aware of his lack of knowledge about the representation's truth or falsity.
3. Intent to Induce Reliance;
   1. D must intend the misrepresentation to be relied up as truthful by V.
      1. A joke not intended to be taken seriously is not actionable.
   2. V who relies on a misrepresentation must be the intended recipient or one to whom D had reason to expect the misrepresentation would be communicated and would be relied on in the same type of transaction.
4. Causation;
   1. The misrepresentation must cause reliance.
      1. If V is not deceived, the tort is not actionable.
      2. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines: Nader was denied recovery for his claim based upon the failure of the airline to disclose its overbooking policy for confirmed airline reservations. The federal appeals court ultimately rejected Nader's recovery, as he had been "bumped" previously and was aware of the airline's practice.
   2. D's misrepresentation need not be the sole cause of V's deception, but it must be a substantial factor in misleading V.
   3. D is only liable for foreseeable damages.
5. Justifiable Reliance;
   1. V's reliance must be justifiable.
      1. Reliance is not justifiable if the misrepresentation is immaterial to the transaction or a mere opinion (subject to exceptions above).
      2. Courts and Restatement look to the qualities and characteristics of the particular P and the circumstances of the particular case in determining

when P's reliance may be unjustified even when the misrepresentation is a material fact.

• A knowledgeable V who relies on an obvious falsity, despite his ability to easily recognize the falsity, is unjustified in his reliance.

1. However, contributory or comparative negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort; therefore, a fool may be protected from intentional fraud.

• Damages

1. MAJ: Courts award pecuniary damages based on the "benefit of the bargain" if the misrepresentation had been true (like a breach of K).
   1. Misrepresented Value - Actual Value
2. MIN: Only award for P's "out-of-pocket" losses (tries to restore P to his position before the tort.
   1. Price Paid - Actual Value
3. Restatement allows P to choose between benefit of the bargain or out-of-pocket losses if he is the direct V; third-party Vs are limited to out-of-pocket losses.
4. Most courts under either approach generally allow consequential damages, such as physical injuries and punitive damages (when malice is proven); damages for mental distress are ordinarily not awarded.

• Defenses to Intentional Torts (D has burden of proving defense)

1. Consent
   1. Definition: If the asserted V gives permission, what would otherwise be tortious is instead privileged.
   2. Express and Implied Manifestations of Consent
      1. Generally, consent is a valid defense when it is objectively manifested.
         1. If D's actual knowledge of P's lack of consent contradicts P's otherwise objective manifestation of consent, such knowledge controls.
      2. P can express consent in words or through gestures.
      3. P can imply consent when his actions reasonably convey consent (e.g., lack of objection to known trespasser) or by adhering to community custom (e.g., allowing a stranger to walk on private property to ring a door bell - unless a "no trespassing" sign is posted).
   3. Consent by Law
      1. Consent can be implied by law (e.g., consent to emergency medical procedures when unconscious - unless notice is given by wearing a bracelet or having medical orders near hospital bed).
   4. Invalidating Manifestations of Consent
      1. Incapacity
         1. A child, based on age, can consent to some things, but a legal guardian must consent for elective surgery. A controversial issue is whether an adolescent may consent without parental permission for an abortion.
         2. An insane or mentally retarded individual may not legally consent. The degree of incapacity required to invalidate consent varies with the activity in question.
         3. Incapacity may be the result of drug (including alcohol) ingestion.

Incapacity that is not known or should not be reasonably known by a potential D should not invalidate a defense of consent.

A threat to use deadly force (e.g., brandishing a weapon) is not deadly force if V does not intend to use it but only threaten with it.

1. 1. Obligation to Retreat from Deadly Force
      1. V need not retreat from a non-deadly threat and may reply in kind.
      2. MAJ: V need not retreat from a deadly threat, either, provided V has a legal right to be present or proceed.
      3. MIN/Restatement: V must retreat where deadly force would be required in self defense, except:
         1. V need not retreat from his dwelling, unless the aggressor also lives in the dwelling; and
         2. V need not retreat if he reasonably or correctly believes that such a retreat could not safely be accomplished.
2. Defense of Others
   1. Definition: A person can use reasonable force to protect a third person from immediate unlawful physical harm.
      1. MAJ: The third party need not be a family or household member; he can be a stranger.
   2. Limited Privilege Rule
      1. Some courts allow privilege to use force in defense of a third person only when the person being defended was privileged to use self-defense.
         1. A reasonable, but incorrect, mistake of fact regarding whether the person being attacked is privileged to use self-defense does not relieve the intervener from liability.
   3. Restatement Rule
      1. Other courts have concluded that there is a privilege to use reasonable force to protect a third party whenever the actor reasonably believes a third party is entitled to exercise self-defense.
3. Defense and Recovery of Property
   1. Definition: An individual is privileged to use reasonable force to prevent a tort against her real or personal property. However, unlike self-defense, a reasonable mistake will not excuse force that is directed against an innocent party.
   2. Reasonable Force
      1. Only reasonable force may be exercised in protection of property.
         1. Deadly force is never reasonable to protect just mere property.
         2. Even slight force is unreasonable in defense of property if it is excessive (e.g., a property owner is not privileged to push a trespasser if a verbal request to leave his property would suffice).
      2. Force that appears reasonable at the time is privileged even if it later is found to be unnecessary.
   3. Force Against a Privileged Party
      1. Unlike in self-defense, if an actor makes a reasonable mistake about whether his victim is privileged to intrude or use property and uses force against the privileged victim, the actor is liable unless the victim intentionally or negligently led the actor to believe that the victim was not privileged.
   4. Defense of Habitation

Restatement allows deadly force when needed to prevent any breaking and entry into a dwelling and possibly other buildings.

The reasonable person is expected to recognize the dangerousness of certain common items (fire, loaded guns, etc.).

1. 1. Reasonable person should be aware of what is evident, open, and apparent.
   2. The reasonable person has the general experience of the community (therefore, if D is new to the community, he must rise to its standard).
2. Flexibility in the Reasonable Person Standard
   1. Emergency Doctrine
      1. Nearly all states permit the jury to consider in its determination of D's reasonableness evidence that D was acting under emergency conditions.
         1. The standard becomes a reasonable person in a similar emergency situation.
         2. Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co.: A taxi driver that jumped out of his car when a gun-wielding thief got in was held not to be negligent even though the taxi ran onto the sidewalk and injured pedestrians.
      2. The emergency doctrine in unavailable where D's tortious conduct contributed to the creation of the emergency.
      3. D may be negligent for failure to anticipate an emergency (e.g., a business operator should anticipate a fire, a pool operator should anticipate a drowning, etc.)
   2. Physical Conditions
      1. D's own physical qualities may be taken into account by the jury in the breach determination.
         1. Jury should consider conduct expected of a reasonable person with D's height, loss of a limb, blindness, deafness, or other illness or disability.
            1. However, a person with a disability may be expected to take more care or avoid certain activities (e.g., a blind person should not drive).
         2. Totally involuntary actions (e.g., from an epileptic seizure) are not negligent acts where D had no warning.
      2. D's voluntary intoxication is disregarded - he is held to a reasonable sober person standard.
         1. Involuntary intoxication is typically treated as a physical ailment.
   3. Mental Conditions
      1. Mental disabilities are generally irrelevant for negligence purposes.
      2. MAJ: Insane, mentally deficient, stupid, low-intelligent, excitable, or accident-prone D is held to the standard of a sane reasonable person with normal intelligence.
      3. MIN: Allow some exceptions for unforeseen sudden attacks of mental illness or for negligent acts committed by mentally deficient patients against their paid caregivers.
         1. Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co.: P was allowed to recover from a motorist, D, who had a sudden insanity attack and tried to follow a light from God off the road thinking she could fly like Batman. D had notice of her delusional behavior before she got behind the wheel.
   4. Effect of Superior Abilities, Skills, or Knowledge

Generally, D's experience and abilities (provided he is not a "professional") will not be considered in determining his standard of conduct - he will be held to the standard of a reasonable person under same or similar circumstances.

1. However, his attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment will be considered in determining whether he has breached the standard of conduct.
   1. The reasonable person standard sets a minimum conduct level, but those possessing greater ability are expected to use it (a reasonable person is expected to use all of his faculties).

Typically only professions that require post-graduate education qualify.

1. 1. Restatement includes vocations and trades such as electricians, plumbers, and pilots.
2. Custom establishes the standard of care.
   1. Deviation from custom proves breach.
   2. Compliance with custom insulates D from negligence liability.
3. Medical Malpractice
   1. A physician is held to the professional standard of care when acting in a professional capacity; he must use and possess knowledge and skill common to members of the profession in good standing - only requires physician to be of minimal competence (not average or highly skilled).
      1. Standard of care is set by custom (jury may not find that custom itself is unreasonable).
   2. Alternative Approaches to the Practice of Medicine
      1. D is protected from liability if his approach is a reputable or respectable treatment although there are other treatment alternatives, irrespective of the relative merits of each alternative.
         1. Doctors should obtain an express assumption of risk from their patients for new treatments that have not become established customs in order to avoid potential negligence claims.
   3. Proof Issues in Medical Malpractice
      1. Failure to cure or occurrence of complications does not prove malpractice (res ipsa loquitur is not of use to P because development of an inherent risk is not proof of negligence).
      2. Expert Witnesses
         1. Expert testimony helps establish the appropriate standard of care - the relevant medical custom - and D's breach of duty.
            1. Testimony regarding what the expert would have done himself is irrelevant.
         2. Expert need not practice the same type of medicine as D to testify, but he must have familiarity with the custom applicable to D's practice (or that his field of medicine has the same custom as D's field).
         3. Custom of Other Doctors in the Relevant Medical Community
            1. General Practitioners
               1. MAJ/Same or Similar Locality Rule: D is held to the standard of doctors engaged in a similar practices in similar localities, considering geographical location, size, and character of the community in general.
            2. Specialists
               1. MAJ: Specialists are held to a nation-wide standard.
      3. Common Knowledge Exception and Res Ipsa Loquitur
         1. Some medical malpractice does not require expert testimony: amputating the wrong limb, operating on the wrong organ, leaving a foreign object inside the patient.

P may also use expert testimony to show that the harm she suffered does not usually occur except when there has been medical malpractice, thereby proving her case by res ipsa loquitur.

Negligence liability is only imposed where D engages in unreasonable risk creation - D creates risks that a reasonable person would not - that should have been foreseen at the time of D's conduct.

1. 1. 1. Fairness and efficiency support premising liability on fault.
   2. The Hand formula: Liability depends on whether the burden (B) is less than the injury (L) multiplied by the probability (P) [If B < P*L, then D acted unreasonably]
      1. Probability
         1. Measures the likelihood of the harm-causing occurrence taking place (how foreseeable the harm-causing event is).
      2. Magnitude of the Loss
         1. Likely harm flowing from the injury-causing event when it occurs (what a reasonable person would foresee as the likely harm - not necessarily the actual harm that occurred).
      3. Burden of Avoidance
         1. Costs associated with avoiding the harm, alternatives and their feasibility, inconvenience to those involved, and the extent to which society values the relevant activity.
            1. All activities involve some risk taking - eliminating all risk is not the goal of negligence liability.
            2. Burdens are expected to be borne by D based on what a reasonable person could afford in light of the likelihood and magnitude of foreseeable losses.
2. Role of Custom
   1. Custom = well-defined and consistent way of performing a certain activity, often among a particular trade or industry.
   2. Deviation from Custom
      1. If P can persuade the jury that there is a well established custom - widespread enough that D knew or should have known about it - the jury may consider D's deviation from custom in its determination of breach of duty.
         1. Deviation from custom does not itself prove breach of duty.
            1. D is still held to reasonable person standard, but deviation from custom is strong evidence that D did not act reasonably.
      2. P needs to show that the harm he suffered was the harm sought to be avoided by the custom (custom plays into a perception of probability of the harm in the Hand formula).
      3. D's argument that taking precautions (assuming the burden) would be too costly is weak when it is customary for those in his industry to take such precautions.
   3. Compliance with Custom
      1. Evidence of D's compliance with custom is usually admissible as evidence of D's lack of unreasonableness.
         1. Jury may find adherence to custom suggestive of a high burden of avoidance or a low probability of harm.

D's compliance with custom does not establish his reasonableness, though.

1. The jury may find that the custom itself is unreasonable.

MIN of Jxs do not accept negligence per se and only allow violation of a statute to be used as evidence of unreasonableness.

1. 1. 1. Effects of Adoption of the Statute and Statutory Violation
         1. The statutory requirements replace the reasonable person standard.
         2. All the jury must decide is whether D violated the statute.
         3. P must also prove the other elements of negligence: cause-in-fact, proximate cause, and damages.
   2. Role of Excuse
      1. Modern courts have recognized excuses to statutory violations in negligence cases (e.g., sudden emergency not of the actor's making, compliance would involve greater danger than violation, actor neither knows nor should know of the occasion for diligence, actor has some incapacity rendering the violation reasonable, or party is unable to comply after reasonable efforts).
         1. In practical effect, finding an excuse exculpates D because it shows the reasonableness of his conduct.
   3. Negligence Per Se and Children
      1. MAJ: Child standard of care generally applies instead of a statutory per se standard.
         1. Violation of the statute may be evidence of unreasonableness if a child of like age, intelligence, and experience would have obeyed the statute.
         2. If the child-D is involved in an adult activity, he would be held to the adult standard and negligence per se would become central to the case.
   4. Compliance with Statute (Reasonableness Per Se)
      1. The rule is well-settled that compliance with a statute is merely relevant evidence of reasonableness; compliance does not establish due care.
         1. The statute establishes the minimum acceptable conduct - not reasonable conduct.
2. Proof of Breach: Res Ipsa Loquitur
   1. Where res ipsa loquitur applies, a jury may infer that D acted unreasonably without any other proof that D failed to use due care.
      1. Res ipsa loquitur is most important in cases where P is unable to make specific allegations about what D did wrong.
      2. From the happening of the accident, P seeks to establish that the harm-causing event was probably due to negligence and D was probably the culpable party.
      3. Traditional three elements must be proven by P by a preponderance of the evidence:
         1. It is an accident that normally does not happen without negligence;
         2. D had exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused the harm; and
         3. P was not at fault.
      4. Restatement Elements:
         1. The event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence;
         2. Other responsible causes, including conduct of P and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
         3. The indicated negligence is within the scope of D's duty to P.

Byrne v. Boadle: P was seriously injured when a barrel of flour fell on him. No witnesses testified as to anything done by D that could have led to the barrel falling. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of proof that D was the responsible party and or that he committed an unreasonable act. The Exchequer Court, in reversing the trial judge, noted that the barrel could not roll out of a warehouse without some negligence and to require P to call witnesses from the warehouse to prove negligence would be preposterous.

MIN: Res ipsa loquitur may not be pled if specific allegations of negligent acts are made.

1. 1. Also, a court may deny res ipsa loquitur if P could have discovered the actual cause of an accident through investigation but chose not to.

2. Cause-In-Fact
   1. "But For" Analysis
      1. MAJ/Traditional Test for Causation: But for D's culpable conduct or activity, P would not have been injured.
         1. D's negligence is not a "but for" cause if the outcome would have been the same even if D had not been negligent.
         2. Generally, P has the burden of establishing "but for" causation.
            1. By a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not D was a "but for" cause of P's injury).
      2. There may be multiple "but for" causes if any of several actors could have avoided the injury by acting reasonably.
   2. Substantial Factor Test
      1. Used when redundant multiple causes (each sufficient alone to cause the harm) would preclude liability under the "but for" analysis.
         1. If D materially contributed to P's injury, he may be considered a cause-in-fact.
         2. Test eliminates liability for insignificant contributions to causation.
      2. Restatement and some Jxs utilize a substantial factor test to convey to the jury the requirement of both actual and legal causation in all cases.
         1. Restatement still requires that "but for" causation should be established, except in redundant cause cases.
      3. "Substantial Factor" is vague; some courts have used it beyond redundant cause cases (e.g., medical malpractice) where policy concerns justify relaxing the "but for" requirement.
   3. Incremental Loss
      1. P may recover damages for extra increments of pain, suffering, or harm caused by D's negligent conduct even if harm, death, or destruction were inevitable because of an external factor.
   4. Proof Problems in Cause-in-Fact
      1. Shifting the Burden of Proving Causation
         1. Courts may shift the burden of proof by requiring Ds to prove they were not the actual cause when each breached a duty of care to P and one was necessarily responsible for the actual cause (Ds are punished for their behavioral rather than causal conduct).
            1. Usually limited to where there is a small number of Ds that have all acted tortiously toward an innocent P at nearly the same time.
            2. Courts generally require that all wrongdoers be joined as Ds.
         2. Restatement holds that where the conduct of two or more actors is substantially and simultaneously tortious, but the cause of the harm is caused by only one of them, the burden is on each actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.
         3. Summers v. Tice: Two hunters negligently fired while P stood in the line of fire. A shotgun pellet hit P's eye, but it was impossible to establish which

hunter had fired the pellet. Under a standard "but for" analysis, P would be unable to prove more likely than not that either of the Ds was the cause of the injury. Because each D had breached the duty of care to P, the court shifted the burden of proof to each D to prove that he was not the cause-in-fact. Since neither D could exculpate himself, they were treated as joint tortfeasors.

• Market Share Liability (MIN)

1. This theory extends and modifies the burden-shifting doctrine and pertains to suppliers of defective products where P cannot prove which brand of product he used.
   1. Unless D can prove it was not the cause-in-fact of P's injury, each D pays to each P a portion of P's damages equal to D's proportionate share of the market for the product.
      1. For example, if D1 had a 20% market share and D2 had a 15% market share of a dangerous product, D1 would pay 20% of each P's damages and D2 would pay 15% of each P's damages.
      2. Any percentage of market share that was not represented by the group of Ds would go uncompensated (i.e., liability is several only).
      3. Courts are SPLIT on what defines a market (national, local, etc.) thereby pulling in Ds that could not have possibly harmed a specific D. This theory is based on imposing liability because of D's tortious conduct rather than because of P's harm caused.
2. Sindell v. Abbott: Daughters of women who used the drug DES during pregnancy developed various reproductive diseases, including ovarian cancer, years later. The diseases could be attributed to the drug, but in many instances, P could not establish which brand of DES her mother used. The court held that once P established D's culpability - that D had manufactured and marketed a dangerous drug - D had the burden of proving that it was not the cause-in-fact of P's harm. If D could not disprove its culpability, it was responsible for its share of the DES market at the time of the mother's exposure to the product. Ps were required to join enough drug companies as Ds so that a substantial share of the market was represented (this is a questionable requirement because each D is only severally liable for its percentage of the damages).
   1. The court rejected the "enterprise liability doctrine" of Hall v. DuPont because all DES manufacturers (over 200) were not represented as Ds and the DES industry was not governed by a trade association that promulgated standards. Therefore, the court found that Ds were not "acting in concert" (akin to conspiracy), which could have made each liable for the tortious acts of the others.
3. Market share liability has not been used widely outside of DES cases; when there are too many other possible causes of P's harm or there is a long time delay between exposure and harm, proving a causal connection becomes more difficult.

• Medical Uncertainty Cases

1. MAJ/Traditional View: P must prove that D's conduct was a "but for" cause of D's injury.

Under this approach, courts do not allow recovery for malpractice - no matter how blatant - unless P would have had more than a 50% chance of survival or recovery in the absence of D's negligence.

Proximate cause is generally not an issue in intentional torts because D's intent must be proven, including application of the transferred intent doctrine of the five historical trespass torts. Courts generally are willing to find proximate cause when D acted intentionally.

1. Proximate Cause Tests
   1. Foreseeability Test
      1. The leading test for proximate cause focuses on whether D should have reasonably foreseen, as a risk of his conduct, the general consequences or type of harm suffered by P.
         1. Result or type of harm must be reasonably foreseeable - the extent and precise manner in which the harm occurs need not be foreseeable.
         2. There must not be a superceding intervening force: human, animal, mechanical, or natural force that occurs after D's conduct which causes P's injury and is sufficient to relieve D of liability.
      2. Wagon Mound and Reasonably Foreseeable Consequences
         1. MAJ: Most courts require a finding of reasonable foreseeability of consequent damages.
         2. Wagon Mound I: P's dock was burned as a result of oil negligently spilled by D's ship. This oil joined with the hot molten metal that was released into the water by P's employees while they were soldering the dock. The court held that because D could not reasonably have been expected to know that the spilled oil was capable of being set on fire in the water, the court ruled for D since the consequence was not reasonably foreseeable.
         3. Wagon Mound II: The owner of another ship destroyed in the fire sued the same D for negligent discharge of oil. This P argued that the resulting fire was a foreseeable risk from the oil spill, and the court accepted the claim. The court emphasized that, while the risk of fire was relatively remote, the foreseeability required need not be great when the risk, if manifested, would be significant and there were no justification to incur the risk. The court concluded that if a reasonable man would have realized and foreseen or prevented the risk, then it must follow that D is liable.
      3. Type of Harm versus Manner and Extent
         1. While the consequence or type of harm must be reasonably foreseeable, the precise manner in which it occurs and the extent of the harm need not be foreseeable.
            1. D would be responsible for keeping an open flame near a gas outlet, where one could reasonably foresee an explosion, even though one could not reasonably foresee that a rat would ignite its fur and cause the explosion.
            2. All foreseeable Ps (to whom D owes a duty) may recover for the type of foreseeable harm caused, even though the extent of the harm was not foreseeable (e.g., a fire got out of control).
      4. Superceding Intervening Forces
         1. The foreseeability test is limited by the additional requirement that there be no superseding intervening force.

Superseding intervening forces are new forces which join with D's negligence to injure P.

P need not establish foreseeability of the type of harm but must instead prove the absence of any intervening forces.

1. 1. 1. In re Poemis: Servant of D who leased a yacht dropped a plank creating a spark that caused petrol flames to ignite and the ship to explode. The explosion was deemed unforeseeable, but D's servant's actions were the direct cause of the explosion because no intervening force existed.

   2. "Practical Politics" and "Rough Sense of Justice" Test
      1. MIN: Some courts will agree with Andrew's dissent in Palsgraf and will depart from the reasonable foreseeability test.
         1. These courts rely on public policy considerations, fairness, and justice to determine proximate cause rather than logic or a mechanical test.
         2. Andrew's test considers foreseeability not from D's perspective before the accident but from the perspective of what would appear to be the natural results of a negligent act looking back to the accident.
      2. Kinsman I: P was able to recover for lost property when D's boat became unmoored, collided with another boat, and set it adrift. The two boats collided with a drawbridge, clogged the river with ice and caused a flood that damaged P's property.
      3. Kinsman II: The court did not extend D's liability to economic damages suffered by ships that had to navigate around the clogged drawbridge.
   3. Restatement Test (MIN)
      1. An actor's negligent conduct is the legal cause if:
         1. His conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm; and
         2. There is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in harm.
      2. "Substantial factor" encompasses both proximate cause and cause-in-fact.
      3. Restatement, like Andrew's dissent, considers proximate cause in light of "prevision" of what subsequently occurred.

2. Limitations on Duty
   1. Failure to Act (Nonfeasance)
      1. An actor typically is liable for affirmative acts that create an unreasonable risk of harm but not for nonfeasance.
         1. Misfeasance by commission or omission generally gives rise to a duty.
            1. Misfeasance often consists of affirmative acts of misconduct - doing something that a reasonable person would not do (e.g., firing a gun in a crowded area).
            2. Misfeasance can also be shown by a negligent omission - failing to do something that a reasonable person would do while engaged in other activity (e.g., paying attention while driving).
         2. An actor does not generally have a duty to act to prevent or alleviate another's harm except in certain circumstances:
            1. When a special relationship (including a contractual relationship) exists;
            2. When D, or an instrument under his control, has created the peril; or
            3. When D voluntarily undertakes to acts and puts P in a worse position.

Some states and foreign countries have enacted criminal laws that punish those who do not aid a person in peril if doing so would not put the actor in danger.

SPLIT: Whether a gratuitous promise, without more, gives rise to a duty.

1. 1. A promise creating reliance may give rise to a tort duty.
   2. Even where there is a contractual obligation to repair, courts are divided about whether breach of this contractual provision leading to personal injury gives rise to a tort duty.

2. Duty to Control and Protect
   1. Generally, a person is not legally obligated to control the conduct of another or to take steps to protect another from harm except when a special relationship exists (between D and P or D and a third party).
   2. Duty to Control
      1. While generally a person had no obligation to control another person's conduct to prevent harm to a third person, exceptions arise if there is a special relationship.
         1. The relationships giving rise to duty to control require some relationship between D and the third party, combined with knowledge (actual or constructive) of the need for control.
            1. If D takes possession of dangerous persons (e.g., criminals or mentally ill) and negligently permits them to escape.
            2. Although a child's parents are not vicariously liable for their child's torts (unless statutorily responsible), they are responsible for supervising their child and may be liable when the child attacks another and the parents knew or should have known the child's tendency toward violence.
               1. Wells v. Hickman: A mother sued the mother and grandparents of a child who killed her son for wrongful death claiming that Ds were aware or should have been aware of the child's propensity toward violence. The court ruled that duty is limited to those circumstances where a reasonably foreseeable victim is injured by a reasonably foreseeable harm. Here, the mother could not reasonably foresee the child's homicidal tendencies based on his history of cruelty to animals and suicide threats. Also, the grandparents did not have a duty to protect the decedent because they were unaware that he was in their backyard.
      2. For there to be at duty to control, D must be in a position to exercise control over the third party for the protection of P.
      3. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif.: Ps asserted that D, a therapist, had a duty to warn them or their daughter of death threats against the daughter made by the psychotherapist's patient. The court held that a psychotherapist has an obligation to take reasonable steps to protect a third party where the therapist knows, or based on professional standards, should know that the therapist's patient presents a serious risk of physical harm to the third party.
         1. Some Jxs apply Tarasoff warnings to foreseeable Vs; others limit it to readily identifiable Vs.

Some Jxs do not apply it to threats of property damage.

Governmental immunity may limit duty, and a governmental actor performing improperly is not usually liable to individuals harmed because any duty owed is limited to the public at large rather than to any specific individual.

1. 1. 1. Generally, a governmental official may be liable for negligently executing policy but not for negligently making policy decisions.
   2. Police Duty
      1. MAJ: Police departments are typically not liable for failing to protect individual citizens.
      2. Most courts limit finding a duty to situations where police undertook to act and created reliance, enlisted the aid of P, or increased the risk of harm to P.
      3. Some Ps have asserted that constitutional equal protection rights and civil rights statutes impose a duty (however, the Supreme Court has held that due process does not impose a duty to protect).
      4. Supervisory responsibility over other police officers can lead to civil and criminal liability if the supervising officers unreasonably fail to intervene.
   3. Public Duty Doctrine in Other Contexts
      1. Many courts have held fire departments immune from liability for negligently fighting or failing to respond to a specific fire.
      2. Courts are reluctant to overrule legislative or executive decisions about public policy decisions regarding allocation of resources (e.g., in mass transit and public schools)

2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED)
   1. Direct Actions
      1. P sues for emotional harm occasioned by D's tortious conduct directed toward P.
      2. MIN: Physical Impact Rule
         1. Very few, if any states, retain the historic rule that V must suffer physical contact by D's negligence to recover for mental distress.
         2. Courts allow mental distress recovery as a parasitic injury so long as V suffered any impact - the impact need not itself cause the physical injury.
            1. Even slight impact like electric shock or x-rays have been sufficient.
      3. MAJ: Risk of Physical Impact Rule - The Zone of Danger
         1. P may recover for mental distress if P was at risk of physical impact.
            1. MAJ: P must suffer physical symptoms of mental distress.
               1. Heart attacks, miscarriages, panic attacks accompanied by abdominal pain, and stomach troubles have sufficed.
               2. Crying, sleeplessness, increased migraine headaches, and upset feelings have failed to suffice.
      4. MIN: Special Cases
         1. Ps have been able to recover for mental distress in the following cases (without proving physical manifestations of such distress):
            1. Negligently handling a close relative's corpse.
            2. Erroneous notification of a close relative's death.

Generally, courts do not allow for recovery for mental distress resulting from destruction of chattel.

1. However, some courts allow recovery if the property as particular sentimental value and D should have foreseen such distress.

MAJ: P may recover regardless of whether mental distress is due to fear over one's own safety or harm to another.

1. 1. 1. MAJ/Restatement: P must suffer physical manifestations of mental distress.
   2. Substantial MIN: Dillon v. Legg
      1. P can recover if he is a bystander to an accident and not physically at risk himself if:
         1. P is Physically Near the Scene of the Accident
            1. P has been able to recover upon witnessing the aftermath of an accident in a hospital, not at the scene.
         2. P has Contemporaneous Sensory Perception of the Accident
            1. Some courts have allowed P to recover when he hears but does not see the accident or comes immediately after the accident and witnesses the aftermath.
            2. P has been denied recovery when witnessing an accident but being unaware that V is dead (thinking that V is sleeping), or upon hearing an accident but not knowing at that time that it was a death-inflicting injury.
         3. P is Closely Related to V
            1. Some courts insist on legal marriage, parental, child, or sibling relationship.
      2. MAJ: P must suffer physical manifestations of mental distress.

2. Wrongful Death
   1. Wrongful death damages may be claimed when V is killed by an intentional tort, strict liability, or by negligence.
      1. Wrongful death claims are in addition to NIED, survival actions, and loss of consortium claims.
      2. MAJ: Wrongful death is a derivative claim to V's tort against D. Therefore, contributory/comparative negligence of V or P in bringing about V's death may eliminate/reduce an award for wrongful death.
   2. Early C/L did not allow recovery by anyone when D tortiously killed V, but now, all Jxs have enacted wrongful death statutes.
      1. Who May Recover
         1. An action may be brought only by those permitted to do so by the Jx's wrongful death statute.
         2. A surviving spouse, parents, and children are typically permitted to bring an action.
            1. Statute may exclude long-time partners, close friends, non-adopted children.
            2. SPLIT: Whether an adopted child may bring a claim for the wrongful death of the child's biological parent.
            3. SPLIT: Whether parents can bring an action for the wrongful death of an unborn (viable or unviable) fetus.
            4. MIN: Compensation allowed based on decreased value of V's estate due to his premature death.
      2. Recoverable Damages

MAJ: Only pecuniary losses that P would have received from V.

1. P must prove loss - this considers: life expectancy of V, life expectancy of P, V's income potential, education, career path, generosity, P's need, the value of services performed by V less amounts P would have provided to V.

Loss of consortium applies when D inflicts serious (mental or physical) injury (rather than death) to V, a close relative of P.

1. 1. Early C/L: Allowed husband to recover for lost services of his wife (like loss of an asset): household services, sexual services, companionship, comfort, etc.
   2. MAJ: Either spouse may recover under loss of consortium for loss companionship, affection, and society when the other spouse in injured by D.
      1. P must prove loss - that D's tortious conduct harmed an otherwise fulfilling and strong relationship.
      2. MAJ: Loss of consortium only applies to spouses (not children-parent, parent-children, or between non-married partners) on the basis of loss of sexual services.
         1. MIN: Allow children/parents to claim loss of consortium since children/parents may recover for wrongful death if V dies instead of just being injured.
         2. Non-married partners (gay or straight) are barred from recovery.
   3. MAJ: Allow recovery for physical or mental injury that directly disrupts the relationship between V and P.
2. Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and Wrongful Conception
   1. These torts do not address whether a child, after birth, may bring a tort action for harm done to it while it was a fetus. This is generally a valid claim.
      1. If the fetus dies before birth, an issue arises whether it is considered a person under the state's wrongful death statute.
   2. In the following torts, if D was non-negligent, the child would not be born at all.
   3. Wrongful Conception
      1. Parents sue D for negligently causing the birth of an unwanted, but healthy, child.
         1. MAJ: Allow recovery of medical costs and pain and suffering associated with the failed procedure, any corrective procedure, pregnancy, and the birth plus mother's lost wages and father's loss of consortium.
            1. MIN: Also add full costs of raising the child to majority.
               1. Some courts will only allow recovery of child rearing costs if parents can prove that they intended not to have children because of financial concerns.
            2. Some courts and Restatement require damage awards to be mitigated by emotional gains of having a healthy child.
      2. Most courts will not allow evidence that P failed to mitigate damages by keeping the child to full term rather than aborting or putting the child up for adoption.
   4. Wrongful Birth
      1. Parents sue D because his negligent genetic counseling or misdiagnosis about the fetus' condition caused the birth of an unwanted child with a health disability.
         1. MAJ: Allow recovery for the extraordinary expenses associated with the birth defect.

Generally, P does not claim that the child was unwanted, so child-rearing expenses are not recoverable (if conception was unwanted, too, P can claim damages under wrongful conception).

Man-made: D must warn or make safe known, concealed artificial conditions which involve risk of death or serious bodily injury - does not apply to artificial hazards that the trespasser would be expected to discover or which are inherent in the use of the land or non-serious risks. This does not impose a duty to inspect for hazards (such as exposed electrical wires).

1. 1. 1. Natural: No duty.

   2. Child Trespasser Doctrine / Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
      1. D is required to exercise reasonable care if (all five):
         1. The place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass;
         2. The condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children;
         3. The children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it;
         4. The utility of the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to the children involved; and
         5. The possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children.
      2. No longer does the condition injuring the child have to lure the child onto the property.
      3. Does not apply to natural conditions.
      4. Does not apply if child, by his age, should appreciate the harm (e.g., harms caused by moving machinery, heights, water, or fire).
      5. D must have clear evidence that a child might come into contact with the harm-causing artificial condition (not enough that a reasonable person would have known).
      6. Does not apply if avoiding the harm would pose a great burden on D, although the greater the risk, the more precautions D must take.

2. Licensees
   1. Licensees are those that enter the land with the express or implied consent of the land possessor, as in the case of social guests, those visiting for their own personal business (e.g., salesperson before D has agreed to transact business), those approaching the front door (unless there is a fence or sign prohibiting such), or police or firefighters.
   2. Activities: Land possessor must act like a reasonable person when engaged in activities (such as mowing the lawn) when the presence of a licensee is known or should be known.
   3. Conditions

Man-made or Natural: D must warn of all known, hidden (not apparent) conditions posing an unreasonable risk of any harm (not just serious or deadly harm).

1. Inspections to discover dangerous conditions and repairs are not required.

There is no duty in the absence of a business, professional, or employment relationship.

1. 1. 1. Duty to Third Parties
         1. MIN: Quasi-Privity
            1. D owes duty only to those third parties to whom D provides information at the request of its client.
               1. P must be specifically identified to D.
         2. MAJ: Restatement/Intended Recipients
            1. D owes duty only to a limited group of persons for whose guidance D intended to supply the information.
               1. P need not be specifically identified to D.
               2. Duty is limited to the transactions D intends, or knows the recipient intends, to influence, or to a substantially similar transaction.
            2. Limited to information provided in a business, professional, or employment relationship.
         3. MIN: No Limit/Foreseeable Recipients
            1. Duty is owed to all foreseeable recipients.
               1. NJ has used this standard but requires that P obtain the information from D's client for a proper business purpose.
      2. Attorney Liability to Third Parties
         1. MAJ: Absent fraud or bad faith, an attorney is not liable for negligently inflicted economic harm on non-client third parties.
            1. Some courts will find an exception when the attorney's client intended to benefit a third party, such as a beneficiary of a will (in those cases, the party that was in privity of K with the attorney is dead and cannot bring the malpractice action).
   2. Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss
      1. Clear MAJ: No legal duty under negligence to refrain from causing pure economic loss.
         1. Economic loss is generally only awarded when it flows from a negligently inflicted personal injury or property damage.
      2. Slight MIN: Exception when P is "Particularly Foreseeable"
         1. People Express v. Consolidated: Allowed recovery of economic damages to an airline forced to shut down because of D's negligent fire. The court ruled that the airline was part of an identifiable class of Ps, which were particularly foreseeable Ps, and the injury was the type of expected economic disruption. However, passengers were not allowed to recover for their lost business deals, etc.
         2. J'Aire v. Gregory: P was the owner of an airport restaurant that had to closed while D renovated the airport's heating and air conditioning. The court allowed P's claim for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage to go forward against D for lost profits incurred due to D's unreasonable delays in renovating the HVAC system despite a privity of K relationship.

2. Defenses to Negligence
   1. Contributory and Comparative Negligence

Contributory Negligence

1. Definition: Conduct on the part of P which falls below the standard of conduct to which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause cooperating with the negligence of D in bringing about P's harm.
   1. Complete bar to P's recovery.
   2. The standard is objective:
      1. Usually reasonable adult standard (unless child or professional standard should be used).
      2. Modern Trend: Some courts make allowances for mental deficiencies or insanity in assessing contributory negligence of P (even though they do not consider mental deficiencies for D's negligence).
   3. P's negligence must be cause-in-fact and proximate cause to his own injuries.
      1. Failure to take precautions to avoid injury is not a cause of the injury (e.g., failing to wear a seatbelt does not cause a car collision).
         1. However, P is required to mitigate his injuries (unless it would be unreasonable to do so because such conflicts with his religious beliefs). Therefore, some courts have characterized failure to wear seatbelts or motorcycle helmets as failure to mitigate in advance of an injury and have held D not responsible for P's exacerbated injuries.
         2. In many Jxs, negligent failure to mitigate is subsumed by comparative negligence.
   4. Contributory negligence is not a defense to intentional torts or willful, wanton, or reckless conduct related to negligent torts.
      1. In comparative negligence Jxs, P's negligence can reduce an award for D's willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.
2. Last Clear Chance Doctrine
   1. P's contributory negligence is not a defense to D's negligent conduct if P's negligent conduct occurs chronologically before D's negligent conduct.
      1. Jxs are generally rejecting the last clear chance doctrine when adopting comparative negligence in place of contributory negligence.
3. Plaintiffs Unable to Exercise Self-Protection
   1. Restatement precludes contributory negligence for D who violates a statute enacted to protect a class of persons from their inability to exercise self-protective care (e.g., child labor laws, sale of liquor to intoxicated persons).

P is 60% responsible for an accident. P can recover 40% of his damages.

1. 1. Modified Comparative Negligence (MAJ)
      1. P is allowed a partial recovery just as in pure comparative negligence, until P reaches a certain level of culpability for his own accident. Once P reaches this level of culpability, P is completely barred from any recovery.
      2. Greater than 50% Approach (>20 states)
         1. P is barred from recovery only when he is more negligent than D (more than 50% responsible)
            1. P and D are equally liable for the accident. P can recover 50% of his damages.
      3. 50% or Greater Approach (15 states)
         1. P is barred from recovery when he is equal to or more negligent than D (greater than or equal to 50% at fault).
            1. P and D are equally liable for the accident. P can recover nothing.
            2. P is 49% liable for the accident. P can recover 51% of his damages.
            3. P, X, and D are equally liable for the accident. X is not included in the suit. P can recover damages from D because he is only 33% at fault.
      4. "Slight" Comparative Negligence (1 state)
         1. P is barred from recovery if negligent unless his negligence is slight.
   2. Determining the Percentage of Fault Attributable to P
      1. The trier of fact selects a percentage based on its appraisal of the relative fault in order to determine an equitable apportionment of loss.

2. Assumption of Risk
   1. Definition: Assumption of risk has traditionally been a complete defense to negligence if P has (all three):
      1. Knowledge of a Particular Risk;
         1. Assumption of risk uses a subjective standard: P must have actual and conscious knowledge of the particular risk (unlike contributory or comparative negligence, which use an objective standard of what P should have known).
         2. P must know of the particular risk, along with its magnitude and implications.
            1. Jury may examine P's actions in a common sense context to determine whether he knew, even if he denies knowing of the risk.
            2. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.: P got on an amusement park ride after seeing that it was a moving conveyer belt which threw riders down as part of the ride. P's negligence award against the amusement park was reversed where the court held that he was aware of the risk before he got on the ride.
      2. Voluntariness; and
         1. P must voluntarily expose himself or his property to the risk.
            1. Courts vary in their interpretation of voluntariness.
         2. Rush v. Commercial Realty: The court held as a matter of law that despite the fact that P knew the floor of the outhouse she was using was in bad order, she had no choice when impelled by the calls of nature and was required to leave the premises. She was held to involuntarily assume the known risk that the

floor would collapse, which it did, thereby barring the defense of assumption of risk.

• Assumption of the Risk.

1. The defense only applies to the particular risk that P knowingly and voluntarily assumes (similar to consent as a defense to intentional torts).
2. Woodall v. Wayne Steffner Productions: A stunt flyer, the "Human Kite," flew while strapped to a makeshift kite attached to a moving automobile, was injured when an inexperienced driver exceeded a safe speed and the kite plunged to the ground as a result. The court held that although P did assume the risk of falling, he did not assume the risk of being driven by an incompetent driver.

• Classifications of Assumption of Risk

1. Express versus Implied Assumption of Risk
   1. Express Assumption of Risk: when, by K or otherwise, P explicitly agrees to accept a risk.
      1. Complete defense to the specific risks P has agreed to assume.
      2. Can be invalidated when it would be contrary to public policy:
         1. Made under duress or coercion,
         2. Where P assumes risk of very reckless conduct,
         3. Where P is at a bargaining disadvantage to D, e.g., employer-employee status, public utility-customer.
      3. Usually not invalidated where P expressly assumes a risk for participation in a recreational activity (e.g., skydiving).
   2. Implied Assumption of Risk: when P's voluntary exposure to risk is derived merely from his behavior not from explicit assent.
      1. Approach 1: Assumption of Risk Remains a Complete Defense
         1. Small number of Jxs hold that while comparative negligence should properly supplant contributory negligence, assumption of risk should remain a complete defense.
            1. Recognizes that comparative negligence does not require a subjective awareness of the risk that assumption of risk does.
      2. Approach 2: Questioning the Reasonableness of the Assumed Risk
         1. Unreasonable assumption of risk is absorbed into comparative negligence as a partial rather than complete defense.
         2. Reasonable implied assumption of risk does not overlap with contributory negligence but, counter-intuitively, is held to remain a complete defense.
         3. An unreasonable P who assumes the risk is only barred from partial recovery while a reasonable P is completely barred from recovery.
      3. MAJ Trend/Approach 3: Absorption of Implied Assumption of Risk into Comparative Negligence
         1. Allows both reasonable and unreasonable implied assumption of risk to be absorbed into comparative negligence (called "comparative fault").
            1. The fact-finder may properly allocate some comparative responsibility to P for assuming the risk.

Firefighters' Rule

Firefighters (and sometimes police officers) are precluded from suing the person who negligently started the fire in which the firefighter was injured (does not preclude suing arsonists).

This is an old torts outline from 1999. The basic torts outline issues have not changed but there are state specific issues. You will be lost if you depend on someone else's torts outline. You must do your own and then compare to be sure you have all the issues. Then test yourself on sample torts essay questions at:

Torts Essay Exam Questions and Answers

ASK A LAWYER YOUR TORTS QUESTION. A DEPOSIT IS REQUIRED.